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Abstract
A growing body of research suggests that some nonhuman animals are capable of making accurate 
metacognitive judgments. In previous studies, nonhuman animals have made either retrospective 
or prospective judgments (about how they did on a test or how they will do on a test, respectively). 
These two types of judgments are dissociable in humans. The current study tested the abilities of 
two rhesus macaque monkeys to make both retrospective and prospective judgments about their 
performance on the same memory task. Both monkeys had been trained previously to make 
retrospective confidence judgments. Both monkeys successfully demonstrated transfer of 
retrospective metacognitive judgments to the new memory task. Furthermore, both monkeys 
transferred their retrospective judgments to the prospective task (one, immediately, and one, 
following the elimination of a response bias). This study is the first to demonstrate both 
retrospective and prospective monitoring abilities in the same monkeys and on the same task, 
suggesting a greater level of flexibility in animals’ metacognitive monitoring abilities than has 
been reported previously.
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Metacognition refers to the ability to reflect on one’s thoughts. Until recently, it was 
considered to be a key feature of conscious awareness and restricted to humans (Metcalfe 
and Shimamura 1994). However, recent studies suggest that some nonhuman animals 
(hereafter animals) also engage in metacognition—that is, they can correctly judge the 
accuracy of their perception and memory (Terrace and Metcalfe 2005).
Studies of metacognition in humans have tended to rely on verbal report—a clear challenge 
for measuring the subjective experiences of nonverbal animals. During the past fifteen years, 
however, an increasing number of studies have developed creative techniques for 
investigating metacognitive abilities in animals (e.g., Beran et al. 2006; Beran et al. 2009; 
Call and Carpenter 2001; Foote and Crystal 2007; Hampton 2001; Hampton et al. 2004; 
Inman and Shettleworth 1999; Kornell et al. 2007; Roberts et al. 2009; Shields et al. 2005; 
Smith et al. 1995; Smith et al. 1998; Washburn et al. 2006).
One of the key questions in the animal metacognition literature (and in animal cognition 
generally) is the degree to which animals’ abilities resemble those of humans. Despite some 
similarities (e.g., Smith et al. 2003), humans demonstrate sophisticated abilities that have yet 
to be demonstrated in animals, such as the active selection of mnemonic strategies, and the 
ability to make complex, graded metacognitive judgments (e.g., Kornell 2009). One key 
aspect of human metacognition is that it is flexible: humans can make metacognitive 
judgments in almost any circumstance without the need for explicit training in each new 
context. The flexibility of animals’ metacognitive abilities is therefore a key question, and 
recent research has shown that rhesus monkeys can indeed make metacognitive judgments 
across different tasks (Kornell et al. 2007) and that they seek different types of information 
necessary to complete a task (Beran and Smith 2011). Studies of flexibility are valuable in 
comparative metacognition because they allow for a broader comparison of animal abilities 
to those of humans, and because they may allow for more nuanced discriminations of 
metacognitive abilities between animal species (e.g., Beran and Smith 2011). The research 
presented here was designed to test flexibility by determining whether monkeys were able to 
make different metacognitive judgments on the same memory task (either preceding or 
following the test). An additional question we asked was whether performance would 
provide further evidence for monkeys’ ability to transfer metacognitive skills between tasks.
The earliest research on metacognitive monitoring in animals used psychophysical 
paradigms to compare the use of an “uncertain” response by humans, monkeys, and a 
dolphin (Shields et al. 1997; Smith et al. 1995). The dolphin’s task was to classify an 
auditory tone as low frequency or high frequency, and the monkeys’ task was to classify a 
visual stimulus as either sparsely or densely pixelated. In both tasks, subjects could also opt 
to select an “uncertain” icon, which produced a reward (albeit one that was considerably 
delayed). Human participants were also trained on both the auditory and the visual tasks. A 
comparison of the performance of the three species revealed some striking similarities. Each 
species used the “uncertain” response appropriately—that is, more often on trials near their 
discriminatory threshold.
Similar use of the “uncertain” response does not, of course, imply that the use of that 
response by different species was a manifestation of the same underlying mechanism. The 
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uncertainty response may have resulted from a learned association between particular 
stimuli and behavioral responses that maximized reward. In order to counter behavioral 
explanations of uncertainty responses, Smith et al. (2008) recommended several 
modifications of the metacognitive paradigms used with animals. The most important were: 
1) to demonstrate immediate transfer of metacognitive skills to new, qualitatively different, 
tasks, 2) the use of abstract cognitive domains, and 3) the use of cognitive judgments (e.g., a 
reliance on internal, rather than exteroceptive, cues). Similarly, Terrace and Son (2009) 
stressed the importance of not allowing escape, or “uncertain,” responses to be made in the 
presence of the stimuli on which animals are trained, as otherwise, it would not be possible 
to rule out stimulus control by the training stimuli. Terrace and Son also argued that escape 
or “uncertain” responses should not be allowed to increase the task’s reinforcement rate 
beyond what would ordinarily be the maximum reward (for instance, by replacing a difficult 
trial with an easy one that would be more likely to yield a reward). This problem can be 
avoided if using the escape or uncertain response does not replace a trial, but instead, simply 
moves to the next trial (e.g., Smith et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2010), or if the uncertain 
response, when used indiscriminately, does not result in maximization of reward. This 
problem can also be avoided when increases in reinforcement rate are accompanied by 
penalties for overusing the uncertain response (in the current experiments, a delay was 
imposed to prevent such bias).
Research on human metacognition employs a variety of different types of judgments, but 
one of the basic divisions is whether judgments are about the past or the future. 
Retrospective judgments are made about events that were previously experienced, e.g., 
confidence judgments (“I’m sure that I was right”), remember/know judgments (“I 
remember the moment at which I learned this information”), and source monitoring 
judgments (“I know because I heard it on the radio”). By contrast, prospective judgments 
refer to judgments of confidence about future events. Examples include feeling of knowing 
judgments (“I’m sure that I would recognize the answer”) and tip-of-the-tongue judgments 
(“I know the answer but cannot produce it”).
Evidence of both prospective and retrospective metacognition has been obtained from 
animals. For example, Hampton (2001) and Fujita (2009) investigated prospective 
metamemory judgments using a delayed matching-to-sample paradigm. Following the 
presentation of the sample, but before test, monkeys were allowed, on some trials, to choose 
whether to proceed to test or to opt out of taking the test. Correct completion of the test 
resulted in a more desirable food reward whereas opting out of the test resulted in a less 
desirable but guaranteed food reward. In both tasks, monkeys performed better on chosen 
trials (those on which they had chosen to proceed to test) than on forced trials. The monkeys 
also chose to opt out more often on trials when no sample was presented. These findings 
suggest that the monkeys opted out of trials on which they did not know the correct response 
and that monkeys are therefore capable of making appropriate prospective metacognitive 
judgments.
Kornell et al. (2007) tested retrospective metamemory judgments using a paradigm that 
measured monkeys’ confidence by asking them to “bet” on the responses they had just made 
on a memory task or a perceptual task (see Shields et al., 2005, for similar findings using a 
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perceptual task). Kornell et al. first trained two monkeys on perceptual tasks (discriminating 
line length, numerosity, and circle size). After making a response, but before feedback was 
given, the monkeys were required to select one of two icons: low or high risk. Selection of 
the low risk icon resulted in a small, guaranteed reward regardless of performance on that 
trial. Selection of the high risk icon resulted in a comparatively large gain if the monkey had 
completed the trial correctly, or an equally large loss if the monkey was incorrect on that 
trial. Rewards were presented or removed by using a computerized token economy, and a 
food reward was delivered once the balance of the token bank reached a certain threshold. 
After mastering the three perceptual tasks, the animals were trained on a memory task. On 
all four tasks, monkeys successfully maximized their reward by selecting low risk on trials 
that they had completed incorrectly, and high risk on trials that they had completed 
correctly. Importantly, monkeys showed immediate transfer of metacognitive skills between 
tasks, indicating that their metacognitive skills were flexible in the sense that they were not 
specific to a particular task.
Although prospective and retrospective metamemory tasks have been used successfully in 
animals, they have not been examined in the same animals and on the same tasks. There are 
reasons to expect that the distinction between prospective and retrospective judgments is 
important. A recent review of neuropsychological evidence from humans suggests that the 
medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) is involved in prospective judgments, whereas the lateral 
PFC is involved in retrospective judgments (see Fleming and Dolan 2012 for a review; also 
see Nelson, 1996). Functional and neurological dissociations have been found in populations 
such as Korsakoff patients (who have frontal lobe damage) and high-altitude climbers (in 
whom hypoxia-induced cognitive impairments have been found; see Nelson et al. 1990, for 
a review). In one study, Korsakoff patients demonstrated impairments in feeling-of-knowing 
accuracy (a prospective judgment) but no impairments in confidence judgment accuracy (a 
retrospective judgment; Shimamura and Squire 1986, 1988). High-altitude climbers tested 
with the same materials showed a similar dissociation between feeling-of-knowing 
judgments and confidence judgments (Nelson, 1996; Nelson et al. 1990). These studies 
suggest that when human frontal lobe function is compromised, prospective judgments 
suffer but retrospective judgments remain intact. It is worth noting that monkeys have 
comparatively less frontal lobe volume than do humans (Semendeferi et al. 2002). An 
examination of prospective and retrospective judgments in animals has the potential to 
further identify similarities, or differences, between human and animal metacognition.
Two experiments were designed to test the flexibility of monkeys’ metacognitive monitoring 
and to examine monkeys’ retrospective and prospective metamemory judgments. In both 
experiments, risk choices were used to measure the monkeys’ certainty about their 
memories. Experiment 1 tested monkeys’ use of retrospective metamemory: the monkeys 
made risk choices after they had completed a memory test. Experiment 2 tested monkeys’ 
use of prospective metamemory: the risk choices were presented after the sample 
presentation (i.e., after learning) but before the memory test. In both cases, the metamemory 
judgments were not made in the presence of either learning or test stimuli. Thus, subjects’ 
responses could not be based on external stimuli, and were therefore more likely to be based 
on the content of their internal memories (Kornell et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2008; Terrace and 
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Son, 2009). In both experiments, we expected that monkeys would tend to make low risk 
judgments when they were incorrect and high risk judgments when they were correct. 
Alternatively, if frontal lobe capacity were a limiting factor in monkeys’ metacognitive 
abilities, we might expect accurate metacognitive performance on the retrospective task 
(Experiment 1) but not on the prospective task (Experiment 2).
Experiment 1: Transfer of retrospective metacognitive monitoring skills 
from previous tasks
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether two monkeys, previously trained to make 
retrospective risk choices, would transfer this ability to a new memory task.
Method
Subjects and apparatus—Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), Ebbinghaus 
and Lashley, were tested. Ebbinghaus and Lashley had extensive experience with 
metacognitive tasks (see Kornell et al. 2007; Son and Kornell 2005). They had previously 
made retrospective risk choices following test on a series of psychophysical tasks and on a 
memory task. Neither monkey was tested concurrently on additional metacognitive tasks 
during the metacognitive testing phase of the current task.
Subjects were housed individually in a rhesus colony room and were transported to a testing 
room in individual transport boxes. Subjects were monitored by a full-time veterinary staff, 
and all housing, transport, and testing procedures were conducted in accordance with 
IACUC guidelines. Subjects were fed Purina monkey chow (Ralston Purina, Richmond, IN) 
and fresh fruit following the completion of their testing. Water was available ad libitum in 
subjects’ home cages.
Subjects completed one 60 trial session per day that lasted approximately 15 minutes. Each 
experimental chamber was housed in an isolated sound-attenuated booth and contained a 3M 
MicroTouch touch-sensitive video monitor (3M, St. Paul, MN) and a Gerbrands pellet 
dispenser (Med Associates, Inc., Georgia, VT). During the task, monkeys received 190-mg 
Noyes banana-flavored pellets (P. J. Noyes, Lancaster, NH) as food rewards.
Stimuli—The stimuli were pictures of various manmade and natural objects that were 
selected at random from a pool of approximately 2,000 pictures. While monkeys saw each 
picture multiple times over the weeks of training and testing, the same picture was never 
repeated on the same day and it was highly unlikely that the stimuli on a given trial were 
ever repeated in the same combination.
Procedure—Before training began, the subjects had been trained on a computerized token 
economy in which they had to earn tokens in order to gain food rewards. A two-dimensional 
bank on the lower-right corner of the screen contained six tokens at the outset of each 
session. Tokens could be gained or lost based on the subject’s responses (see below). When 
the number of tokens reached or exceeded eight, the monkey received two 190-mg banana-
flavored food pellets and the level of tokens was reset to six.
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Monkeys were tested on a working memory task using a modified delayed matching-to-
sample design (Figure 1a). During the sample presentation, monkeys were presented with 
multiple images on the screen simultaneously (2 samples/trial for Lashley; 3 samples/trial 
for Ebbinghaus) for 2500 msec. At the end of the sample presentation (during the last 2000 
msec for Lashley; 1250 msec for Ebbinghaus), a moving border appeared around one of the 
samples, indicating that it should be chosen at test. Test immediately followed the sample 
presentation. The test consisted of all the samples presented on that trial in addition to 
multiple distractors (3 for Lashley; 5 for Ebbinghaus). These different task parameters 
(number of samples, number of distractors, and sample presentation times) were 
manipulated for each monkey during a training phase in order to equate task difficulty 
between monkeys. This resulted in session accuracies between 40% and 70% on the 
matching-to-sample task. The same criteria were used later during the metacognitive test 
phase.
Monkeys were first trained on the memory task without making confidence judgments 
(approximately 300 sessions for Ebbinghaus and 540 sessions for Lashley). During this 
training phase, feedback regarding the accuracy of a trial was given immediately following 
test. When a trial was completed correctly, two tokens were delivered into the monkey’s 
token bank, and when the number of tokens reached eight, the monkey received a food 
reward. When a trial was completed incorrectly, two tokens were removed from the 
monkey’s token bank. The goal of this training period was to ensure that both monkeys 
learned the memory task before the introduction of the confidence judgment.
After the initial training phase on the memory task, a confidence judgment was introduced 
such that monkeys made either a low risk or high risk “bet” on each trial. After test, but 
before feedback regarding that trial’s accuracy, the low and high risk icons appeared on the 
screen. A low risk response was rewarded with one token regardless of the accuracy of the 
monkey’s response on that trial. When a high risk response was made, the monkey received 
three tokens if his response on that trial was correct, but lost three tokens if his response was 
incorrect. Thus, reward was maximized if the subject chose high risk after a correctly 
completed trial and low risk after an incorrectly completed trial. As before, the default value 
of the token bank was six, and when the number of tokens in the bank reached eight, two 
food pellets were delivered and the bank balance was reset to six tokens.
The task used a bias reduction procedure in which the risk icon that was selected less 
frequently during that session was immediately available. The risk icon to which the subject 
responded more frequently was presented after a delay. The length of the delay was 
modified on every trial to reflect the extent of the bias. As the bias increased, the delay 
increased as determined by the following formula:
delay = [(previous bias value)(.97) +/− 1]/2
such that the bias was increased or decreased on each trial by .5 sec. The beginning delay 
value for each session was typically set as the ending delay value from the previous session. 
For the first five sessions following the introduction of the risk icons, both monkeys showed 
slight high risk biases. The maximum delays for Lashley and Ebbinghaus during this period 
were 3.37 sec and 5.98 sec (both biased toward high risk), respectively. Ebbinghaus’ 
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average bias at the end of each session was 2.17 sec toward high risk. Lashley’s average 
end-session delay was 0.24 sec (also toward high risk). While this delay encouraged 
selection of the less-chosen icon, it did not provide any information as to which icon was 
appropriate to select on a given trial.
Results
Data from the first five sessions following the introduction of the risk icons were analyzed to 
determine whether monkeys successfully transferred metacognitive skills from previously 
completed tasks to the current memory task. To determine the metacognitive accuracy of 
monkeys’ confidence judgments, we calculated phi correlations between accuracy and risk 
choice. In the first five sessions following the introduction of the confidence judgment, both 
Ebbinghaus and Lashley showed significant correlations between accuracy and risk choice 
(Ebbinghaus, phi = .36, p < .001; Lashley, phi = .18, p = .001), as both monkeys tended to 
select low risk following incorrectly completed trials, and high risk following correctly 
completed trials. Ebbinghaus’ accuracy on trials on which he selected low risk was 42%, 
while his accuracy on trials on which he selected high risk was 77%. Lashley’s accuracy on 
low risk trials was 60%, and his accuracy on high risk trials was 77% (Figure 2). In both 
cases, session accuracy when low risk was selected was significantly higher than chance 
performance (Ebbinghaus, t(4) = 5.72, p = .005; Lashley, t(4) = 7.28, p = .002). This 
suggests that monkeys were not likely deciding, in advance, to select low risk on a given 
trial. Instead, the monkeys appeared to follow the more advantageous strategy to maximize 
reward: attempting (generally) all trials, and basing their subsequent risk choice on 
perceived performance.
One possible explanation for the differential use of the risk choices is that subjects simply 
chose low risk when they had responded slowly on that trial—that is, that reaction time (RT) 
served as a discriminative stimulus. Because both monkeys showed a significant correlation 
between RT and risk choice (Pearson correlations, Ebbinghaus, r = −.13, p = .03, Lashley, r 
= −.20, p = .001), we calculated partial correlations between RT at test, accuracy, and risk 
choice. After controlling for RT, a significant correlation remained between accuracy and 
risk choice for both monkeys (Ebbinghaus, r = .34, p < .001; Lashley, r = .15, p = .01), 
indicating that RT was not the sole cue for monkeys’ risk choices.
These results demonstrate that monkeys are adept at monitoring their performance and 
responding appropriately on a retrospective metamemory task. Additionally, because 
monkeys immediately responded appropriately following the introduction of the confidence 
judgment—that is, their metacognitive judgment transferred from their previous training to 
this task—these results provide additional evidence that monkeys can learn flexible 
metacognitive monitoring skills that are not task-specific.
Experiment 2: Testing prospective metacognitive monitoring skills
In Experiment 1, Ebbinghaus and Lashley made appropriate retrospective confidence 
judgments on a memory task. Experiment 2 was designed to test whether, using the same 
memory task, these monkeys would make appropriate prospective confidence judgments. 
The task used in Experiment 1 was altered for Experiment 2 such that the risk judgment was 
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made before test (rather than following test; see Figure 1b). Token feedback was provided 
after the memory choice was made, rather than immediately following the risk choice.
Method
Subjects and apparatus—The monkeys and apparatus in Experiment 2 were the same in 
Experiment 1. Neither monkey was tested concurrently on an additional metacognitive task, 
with the exception of Ebbinghaus’ testing on both retrospective and prospective judgments, 
described below. Neither monkey had prior experience making prospective risk choices.
Procedure—After the introduction of the confidence judgment, both monkeys continued 
training on the retrospective task from Experiment 1 (approximately 60 sessions for 
Ebbinghaus and 160 sessions for Lashley), and adjustments to the delay between sample 
offset and test onset were made. Because confidence judgments on the prospective task 
occurred after the sample presentation and before test, the prospective task involved a longer 
delay between sample offset and test onset than did the retrospective task. Thus, to avoid 
decrements in performance upon transfer to the prospective judgment, a delay was gradually 
introduced to the retrospective task that ultimately approximated the delay they would 
experience during the prospective task (2.25 sec).
Experiment 2 began after accuracy on the retrospective task with the longer delay stabilized 
around 55% (task accuracy for the last 10 sessions of the retrospective task was within 1 
standard deviation of task accuracy across all training on the retrospective task). Two minor 
methodological changes were made to the sample presentation in order to achieve similar 
task accuracy levels between the two monkeys. First, although the sample presentation 
lasted 2500 msec, as in Experiment 1, the moving border was now present for 1250–1500 
msec for Ebbinghaus and 1600 msec for Lashley. Second, although Ebbinghaus’ initial 
testing in Experiment 2 involved 3 stimuli during the sample presentation, this value was 
changed such that, in subsequent testing (after the introduction of the bias reduction 
procedure), both Ebbinghaus and Lashley viewed 2 stimuli during the sample presentation.
When the prospective risk judgment was initially introduced, the bias reduction procedure 
used in Experiment 1 was not used, in order to avoid overly long delays between sample 
presentation and test. In the retrospective task in Experiment 1, there was no delay between 
sample presentation and test. In the prospective task in Experiment 2, there was necessarily 
a short delay between sample presentation and test (so that the monkeys could make a risk 
judgment before test). Incorporating the bias reduction procedure between sample 
presentation and test could create a delay of over 10 seconds before test, thereby increasing 
task difficulty. Thus, to achieve our original goal of similar task difficulties across 
Experiments 1 and 2, we began the prospective judgment phase of Experiment 2 without the 
bias reduction procedure.
During the first ten sessions following the introduction of the prospective judgment, only 
Ebbinghaus utilized the high risk option, albeit at a lower rate than on the retrospective task. 
Lashley did not make a single high risk response during the first ten sessions of testing. 
Ebbinghaus began testing on Experiment 2 before Lashley, and after the initial ten sessions 
requiring prospective judgments, two steps were taken to reduce Ebbinghaus’ response bias. 
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First, Ebbinghaus completed approximately 45 days of training in which he completed one 
30-trial session of the retrospective task and one 30-trial session of the prospective task. 
Because this training was not successful in reducing his response bias on the prospective 
task, the bias reduction procedure used in Experiment 1 was introduced. Because both 
monkeys were biased toward making low risk responses during their initial testing on the 
prospective task, each session began with a pre-specified delay before the low risk icon 
became available (Ebbinghaus, 2 sec; Lashley, 1 sec). After the first trial, the delay was 
updated from trial to trial based on each monkey’s response pattern. The introduction of the 
bias reduction procedure resulted in an immediate improvement in Ebbinghaus’ 
performance on the prospective task, although he continued to be tested on a 30-trial 
retrospective session and a 30-trial prospective session each day. After Lashley completed 
his first ten sessions with the prospective judgment without the bias reduction procedure, the 
bias reduction procedure was introduced to his task as well (although he completed only the 
prospective task, rather than both the retrospective and prospective tasks simultaneously). 
Contrary to the high risk bias both monkeys showed on the retrospective task, both showed a 
low risk bias on the prospective task. During the first five sessions, Lashley had a maximum 
delay of 10.76 sec compared to Ebbinghaus’ maximum delay of 5.29 sec. Comparing risk 
biases at the end of each session, however, results for each monkey were similar; 
Ebbinghaus’ average low risk bias was 2.02 sec, while Lashley’s average low risk bias was 
1.45 sec. Results from both the initial five-session transfer period and the first five sessions 
after the introduction of the bias reduction procedure are presented below.
Results
To determine the metacognitive accuracy of monkeys’ confidence judgments, we calculated 
phi correlations between accuracy and risk choice. During the first five sessions following 
the introduction of the confidence judgment, Ebbinghaus’ correlation between accuracy and 
risk choice was significant (phi = .12, p = .04). A correlation could not be computed for 
Lashley because he never chose high risk. Lashley’s extreme low risk bias during the first 
five sessions was likely due to motivational issues rather than task difficulty; his accuracy 
on the first five sessions following the introduction of the confidence judgment (51%) was 
similar to his accuracy on the final five sessions of the retrospective task (45%). Lashley’s 
phi correlation during the final five sessions of the retrospective task was .30 (p < .001), 
indicating an ability to make metacognitively accurate judgments at a similar level of task 
accuracy. As on the retrospective task, session accuracy for low risk responses was higher 
than chance performance (Ebbinghaus, M = 33%, t(4) = 5.98, p = .004; Lashley, t(4) = 6.18, 
p = .003), suggesting that both monkeys were still attempting the task, even on trials on 
which they selected low risk.
During the first five sessions after the bias reduction procedure was introduced, both 
Ebbinghaus’ and Lashley’s performance was characterized by significant correlations 
between accuracy and risk choice (Ebbinghaus, phi = .26, p = .002; Lashley, phi = .21, p < .
001). Both monkeys tended to select low risk before making an incorrect response, and high 
risk before making a correct response. Ebbinghaus’ accuracy on trials on which he selected 
low risk was 26%, while his accuracy on trials on which he selected high risk was 51%. 
Lashley’s accuracy on low risk trials was 32%, and his accuracy on high risk trials was 53% 
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(Figure 3). Ebbinghaus’ session accuracy for low risk trials was significantly above chance 
(t(4) = 3.15, p = .04), but Lashley’s session accuracy for low risk trials was only marginally 
above chance (t(4) = 2.29, p = .08). A possible cause of the lower task accuracy (compared 
to task accuracy on the retrospective task) was the variable delay between sample 
presentation and test introduced by the bias-reduction procedure. In contrast to the 
retrospective task, reaction time was not a plausible cue for selecting low or high risk, since 
the risk choice was made before test.
In sum, these results demonstrate that one monkey successfully transferred metacognitive 
skills from a retrospective task to a prospective task immediately. The other monkey showed 
transfer as soon as his low risk bias was reduced. Thus, both monkeys showed strong 
evidence of prospective metamemory abilities.
General discussion
The results presented in Experiments 1 and 2 add to a growing body of research that has 
demonstrated metacognitive abilities in monkeys. In Experiment 1, which involved a 
retrospective confidence judgment, both monkeys showed immediate transfer of 
metacognitive skills to a new memory task. In Experiment 2, which involved a prospective 
metamemory judgment, both monkeys showed transfer to the new task as soon as it was 
possible to measure their metacognitive abilities (i.e., when their bias was not absolute).
These experiments are the first to demonstrate both retrospective and prospective judgments 
using the same memory task and the same monkeys. Because retrospective and prospective 
judgments are dissociable in humans, it follows that success on one type of task does not 
necessarily predict success on the other. Nevertheless, both monkeys were able to make both 
types of judgments. Further research could clarify whether dissociation between 
retrospective and prospective metamemory does occur among monkeys and other animals, 
or if monkeys tend to demonstrate a greater degree of metacognitive competence than their 
frontal lobe volume might otherwise suggest. Taken together, these results demonstrate a 
new degree of flexibility in animals’ metacognitive abilities (see Smith et al. 2010; 
Washburn et al. 2006). The monkeys transferred their metacognitive monitoring skills to a 
new memory task, thereby replicating transfer abilities described by Kornell et al. (2007). 
Moreover, they were able to switch between different types of metacognitive monitoring 
skills.
The two experiments of this study incorporated several important design features suggested 
by Smith et al. (2008) and by Terrace and Son (2009). First, Experiments 1 and 2 tested 
transfer of metacognitive abilities between tasks. Second, the tasks involved judgments of 
memory tasks—in the case of Experiment 1, a judgment of how well the monkey 
remembered the probe stimulus on that trial, and in the case of Experiment 2, how likely the 
monkey was to remember the probe stimulus at test; thus, judgments were not made in the 
presence of exteroceptive stimuli. Third, every trial during a session consisted of the same 
numbers of sample and distractor stimuli, so the number of samples or test stimuli could not 
serve as a cue on which monkeys could base their risk judgments. Last, the use of the low 
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risk response did not result in an above-maximal reinforcement rate because a low risk 
response did not lead to the replacement of that trial with a potentially easier trial.
This study contributes to a growing understanding of animal metacognitive abilities, but 
much remains to be investigated. Are animals capable of making complex, graded 
metacognitive judgments? To what extent do animals guide their own learning? Above all, 
how do animals behave metacognitively, and are their metacognitive judgments entirely 
implicit? These are just a few areas of exploration that can shed light on the phylogenetic 
origins of metacognition. The flexibility of monkeys’ metacognitive abilities described in 
these studies yields further evidence of comparable metacognitive abilities in animals and 
humans.
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Schematic of the delayed matching-to-sample procedure used a) in the retrospective task in 
Experiment 1 and b) in the prospective task in Experiment 2.
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Average accuracy when low and high risk retrospective judgments were made. The number 
of low and high risk bets following incorrect and correct responses are listed for each 
monkey. Cells with a black background indicate metacognitively appropriate responses. 
Data are from the first 5 days following the introduction of the retrospective risk judgment.
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Average accuracy when low and high risk prospective judgments were made. The number of 
low and high risk bets following incorrect and correct responses are listed for each monkey. 
Cells with a black background indicate metacognitively appropriate responses. Data are 
from the first 5 days following the introduction of the bias elimination procedure.
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